Biometrics as Personal Private Property
A Practical Legal Framework

Written by A.I. (always double check all info)

Intro by Robert Michael

Biometrics is a major concern in 2026. We are freely giving up our biometrics without any claim to it as property. This article solidifies Biometrics as a recognized right to private property. The notice templates on our Documents page are designed as a ground floor claim of right to our private property. Our templates put the recipient on notice basically letting them know that they cannot freely use our biometrics in any way that is not authorized by us and it demands the company or government provide us disclosures on the use of our property. This creates a legally valid record that the government agency or company knew or should have known not to use our biometrics without our consent. It is important to note, that government has police powers and may require our biometrics for the public safety but this does not foreclose specific limitations on the use of them. 

The article below is to help members with a reference guide as to how and why biometrics are considered private property recognized in the legal system. 

American doctrine increasingly treats biometric identifiers such as face geometry, fingerprints, iris scans, voiceprints, gait, and similar measurements as an excludable, licensable interest attached to the person. The conceptual bridge is the Court’s recognition that identity and performance are property‑like; that being the right to control use and to capture the economic value of one’s own identity.

In Zacchini v. Scripps‑Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court described the right to control commercial exploitation of identity as a protectable proprietary interest, aligning it with the incentive structure of other property regimes. That frame is the gateway to biometrics, which are simply machine‑measurable aspects of identity.

Federal appellate authority applies the same control principle to modern advertising and endorsement contexts. In Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, the Seventh Circuit allowed claims based on a merchant’s use of Michael Jordan’s identity to promote goods, making clear that identity can’t be co‑opted under the guise of salutations. The key is consent and control.

Biometric‑specific precedent then makes the control interest concrete. Interpreting the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the Illinois Supreme Court held in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp. that statutory notice‑and‑consent duties create a substantive, individually held interest; violation itself is actionable without additional consequential harm. The Ninth Circuit, in Patel v. Facebook, Inc., similarly held that creating face templates without consent invades private affairs and inflicts a concrete injury loss of exclusive control over immutable biometric markers.

Two additional Illinois decisions underscore the property‑like character of biometric control. In McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, BIPA claims were not preempted by workers’ compensation exclusivity because the injury is the invasion of a personal, legally protected biometric interest. And in Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., each non‑consensual scan or disclosure was deemed a separate, compensable violation akin to counting discrete trespasses.

Real-world outcomes track the doctrine. The consolidated In re Facebook Biometric litigation produced a $650 million settlement for unlawful face-template collection under BIPA; Texas extracted a $1.4 billion settlement from Meta for alleged non-consensual biometric capture under state law. These are not “privacy only” results. They price the value of exclusive control over identity-linked data.

Put simply, U.S. law already treats biometrics as a protected, excludable interest attached to the person. Whether you call that interest “property,” “publicity,” or “statutory control,” the legal consequences are the same: (1) you can withhold consent; (2) you can license use on your terms; and (3) you can recover when another party captures, stores, or transmits your biometrics outside the conditions the law requires.

How to use this frame in practice

• Synthesis for filings and policy: Lead with Zacchini (identity as proprietary control), then show modern courts protecting biometric control as a substantive right (Rosenbach, Patel). Use McDonald to defeat “workplace exclusivity” defenses and Cothron to quantify per-scan harm.
• Business and product terms: Draft opt-in licenses and data-minimization terms that mirror BIPA-style requirements (notice, purpose limits, retention, no sale/disclosure without new consent). The big settlements show how regulators and courts will price noncompliance.
• Public institutions: When government or quasi-public actors deploy biometric systems, insist on lawful basis, strict purpose limitation, and non-biometric alternatives. Comparative law (below) shows the same trajectory abroad.

Key U.S. Authorities (Bluebook)

• Zacchini v. Scripps‑Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).

• Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014).

• Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019).

• Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019).

• McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, 2022 IL 126511, 193 N.E.3d 1253 (Ill. 2022).

• Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 2023 IL 128004, 216 N.E.3d 918 (Ill. 2023).

• In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (class cert.); see also 522 F. Supp. 3d 617 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (final approval).

Comparative Quick‑Cite (Common‑Law Countries)

• Canada — Krouse v. Chrysler Can. Ltd. (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.); Athans v. Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd. (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 425 (H.C.J.); Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 108 O.R. (3d) 241.

• United Kingdom — R (Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2020] EWCA Civ 1058; Data Protection Act 2018 & UK GDPR; Lloyd v. Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, [2021] 3 W.L.R. 1268.

• Ireland — Data Protection Act 2018 (Ir.); Doolin v. Data Prot. Comm’r [2020] IEHC 90; [2022] IECA 117.

• New Zealand — Hosking v. Runting [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1 (C.A.); Privacy Act 2020 (N.Z.).

• Australia — Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); Clearview AI Pty Ltd Determination, OAIC, [2021] AICmr 54; 7‑Eleven Stores Pty Ltd Determination, OAIC, [2021] AICmr 50.